http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/29/reggie-love-barack-obama
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
State of "the Left" Today
Just as social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s emerged from a foundation laid by the radical politics of the 1930s, left-wing activists today continue to grapple with the actions of those would-be revolutionaries whose struggles culminated in the now iconic episodes of global rebellion that flared in 1968. Yet the history of this progression from an Old to a New Left (and now a post-New Left?) is by no means a straightforward or uncomplicated process that can be captured in the plethora of celebratory/nostalgic and generally simplistic accounts of “the sixties.” A critical (if also sympathetic) analysis of Left activism during this era therefore raises a number of questions and concerns of direct relevance to those still involved in “the movement” today. An understanding of the sixties as a period of “blocked cultural revolution” provides grounds for a much-needed discussion of the New Left’s goals and strategies or, as the case may be, its lack thereof.
By this account, the New Left emerged from a terrain shaped by the Marxist-Leninism of the 1930s, even as many of the “red diaper babies” who grew into this movement rejected what they saw as the old model of Communist-inspired organizing. Class analyses therefore gave way to a culturalist mentality whereby the revolutionary agenda entailed a reorganization of society into an egalitarian democratic community. Many on the New Left discarded the need to seize control of the state or liquidate capitalism, arguing instead for the creation of alternative and to some extent anarchist modes of life in which elected leaders and organized political parties had no role except as evils to be avoided. The question of violence intersected this split between those moving towards cultural revolution and those who remained committed to a class-based model of organizing; pacifism and the pre-figurative power of love guided the younger generation of activists, whereas those who still saw revolution as a matter of political-economy argued for the use of vanguardist violence in order to dismantle the global capitalist interstate system. The advent of powerful national liberation movements throughout the Third World bolstered the arguments of Marxist-Leninists against their (counter) culturalist opponents in the United States.
In seeking to understand the sixties historically and draw lessons for the Left today, it seems fair to identify both visions as having major flaws. For while the vanguardist approach modeled after the Bolsheviks was still partially applicable to revolutionary movements in the Third World, it was much less connected to the realities of social and political-economic life in the Unites States in the late 20th century. At the same time, the advocates of countercultural revolution operated in a somewhat sheltered sphere of activism that fostered creativity and individuality while failing to articulate a coherent revolutionary strategy. Thus as the early New Left gave way to a more “radical” approach characterized by the stunted actions of the Weather Underground, forexample, these attempts at violent revolution proved no more successful than the hippies’ efforts to cultivate a peaceful and loving society.
It is crucial that one not overlook the important gains made by the New Left, particularly in the realms of civil rights, feminism, gay rights, and environmentalism. It is equally important to recognize the contributions of those who have maintained a dedication to class struggle throughout the post-1960s era. Whether violent or nonviolent, the spirit of militancy and urgency that persisted throughout the sixties has set the stage, perhaps, for a new (post-Reagan) left-wing upsurge that has been long envisioned yet so far unrealized. The key is to understand how potential Left coalitions turned into opposing, if not warring factions that tended to rehearse old divisions rather than work together to find new solutions. In this sense, the Left might be best served by pursuing something close to the Gramscian model of coalitional praxis that offers a revolutionary strategy combining political-economic and cultural agendas. In the end, however, social movements of the Left will find their most success not by following a certain theoretical model but rather through developing an organic struggle based in a common purpose around which broad coalitions of political and social actors can coalesce.
It is currently being argued by many on the Left that the need to protect the viability of life on earth provides perhaps the most hopeful basis for renewing progressivism in the twenty-first century. If this were to be the case, a pro-environment movement articulated as collective opposition to the global threat of catastrophic climate change would become in essence a “meta movement” uniting various sub struggles in much the same way that opposition to Jim Crow and the Vietnam War gave “the movement” its coherence during the sixties. Of course with the possibility of general antiwar sentiment resurging in opposition to America’s costly “war on terror,” and now a global economic crisis that no doubt will worsen before it can be resolved, a movement connecting these three strains (environment, war, and economy) is actually somewhat foreseeable. That is, if Obama is elected president and takes office in 2009 with a Democratic super-majority in Congress. At this point, social movements on the Left would have an institutional framework in Washington from which to develop grassroots modes of action—a “Green Revolution”—in concert with governmental reforms on the scale of the Neal Deal and Great Society programs (a “Green Deal”?). Progressive ideas might thus gain ascendency and become “common sense” throughout society in much the same manner that conservatism blossomed during the Reagan Revolution.
So while engaging in electoral politics through the Democratic Party does not hold all the answers for the Left, a new regime dedicated rhetorically (and at least somewhat practically) to providing “hope” for the masses and bringing “change” to Washington is at this point the only real place to begin. Should a new era of progressive hegemony dawn in America and perhaps across the globe, it will become manifest decades from now long after Obama has come and gone, when the world will be a very different place. The 2008 presidential election is therefore a test as to whether or not the Left in the US can overcome its fractious divides and begin establishing long-term coalitions designed to gain power and govern effectively while maintaining an ideological commitment to generating reformist and revolutionary strategies from below.
Given the complexities of this task, there is no guarantee that it could be accomplished even if Obama wins. Certainly, such a movement will not coalesce if a newly mobilized Left is not ready to immediately begin allying with or forcefully petitioning/pressuring the Obama administration from within and without. However, should McCain win in November, or should he lose but nonetheless permanently remobilize the reactionary (racist) right-wing fringe that his campaign has now activated, the prospects for Left organizing will be greatly diminished. A McCain-Palin administration would present most of the same obstacles that the Left has faced under the Bush-Cheney regime. Meanwhile, an Obama-Biden administration that lacks a strong base of dedicated progressive support could eventually succumb to the anger and frustration of working-class whites in rural America who will be easily convinced that their problems are the result of the foreigners, socialists, and terrorist sympathizers etc. that have infiltrated the Democratic Party through Obama. In short, conditions at the present crossroads are ripe for a concerted effort to push the country towards something like a European social democracy (partial nationalization of US banks has, for instance, just been announced). At the same time, some variant of a violent reaction—call it fascism or whatever else—is lurking just beneath the surface of an American populace, racked with panic and fear, recently shaped by George W. Bush’s Republicans yet poised to swing decisively leftwards into the arms of Barack Obama’s Democrats.
By this account, the New Left emerged from a terrain shaped by the Marxist-Leninism of the 1930s, even as many of the “red diaper babies” who grew into this movement rejected what they saw as the old model of Communist-inspired organizing. Class analyses therefore gave way to a culturalist mentality whereby the revolutionary agenda entailed a reorganization of society into an egalitarian democratic community. Many on the New Left discarded the need to seize control of the state or liquidate capitalism, arguing instead for the creation of alternative and to some extent anarchist modes of life in which elected leaders and organized political parties had no role except as evils to be avoided. The question of violence intersected this split between those moving towards cultural revolution and those who remained committed to a class-based model of organizing; pacifism and the pre-figurative power of love guided the younger generation of activists, whereas those who still saw revolution as a matter of political-economy argued for the use of vanguardist violence in order to dismantle the global capitalist interstate system. The advent of powerful national liberation movements throughout the Third World bolstered the arguments of Marxist-Leninists against their (counter) culturalist opponents in the United States.
In seeking to understand the sixties historically and draw lessons for the Left today, it seems fair to identify both visions as having major flaws. For while the vanguardist approach modeled after the Bolsheviks was still partially applicable to revolutionary movements in the Third World, it was much less connected to the realities of social and political-economic life in the Unites States in the late 20th century. At the same time, the advocates of countercultural revolution operated in a somewhat sheltered sphere of activism that fostered creativity and individuality while failing to articulate a coherent revolutionary strategy. Thus as the early New Left gave way to a more “radical” approach characterized by the stunted actions of the Weather Underground, forexample, these attempts at violent revolution proved no more successful than the hippies’ efforts to cultivate a peaceful and loving society.
It is crucial that one not overlook the important gains made by the New Left, particularly in the realms of civil rights, feminism, gay rights, and environmentalism. It is equally important to recognize the contributions of those who have maintained a dedication to class struggle throughout the post-1960s era. Whether violent or nonviolent, the spirit of militancy and urgency that persisted throughout the sixties has set the stage, perhaps, for a new (post-Reagan) left-wing upsurge that has been long envisioned yet so far unrealized. The key is to understand how potential Left coalitions turned into opposing, if not warring factions that tended to rehearse old divisions rather than work together to find new solutions. In this sense, the Left might be best served by pursuing something close to the Gramscian model of coalitional praxis that offers a revolutionary strategy combining political-economic and cultural agendas. In the end, however, social movements of the Left will find their most success not by following a certain theoretical model but rather through developing an organic struggle based in a common purpose around which broad coalitions of political and social actors can coalesce.
It is currently being argued by many on the Left that the need to protect the viability of life on earth provides perhaps the most hopeful basis for renewing progressivism in the twenty-first century. If this were to be the case, a pro-environment movement articulated as collective opposition to the global threat of catastrophic climate change would become in essence a “meta movement” uniting various sub struggles in much the same way that opposition to Jim Crow and the Vietnam War gave “the movement” its coherence during the sixties. Of course with the possibility of general antiwar sentiment resurging in opposition to America’s costly “war on terror,” and now a global economic crisis that no doubt will worsen before it can be resolved, a movement connecting these three strains (environment, war, and economy) is actually somewhat foreseeable. That is, if Obama is elected president and takes office in 2009 with a Democratic super-majority in Congress. At this point, social movements on the Left would have an institutional framework in Washington from which to develop grassroots modes of action—a “Green Revolution”—in concert with governmental reforms on the scale of the Neal Deal and Great Society programs (a “Green Deal”?). Progressive ideas might thus gain ascendency and become “common sense” throughout society in much the same manner that conservatism blossomed during the Reagan Revolution.
So while engaging in electoral politics through the Democratic Party does not hold all the answers for the Left, a new regime dedicated rhetorically (and at least somewhat practically) to providing “hope” for the masses and bringing “change” to Washington is at this point the only real place to begin. Should a new era of progressive hegemony dawn in America and perhaps across the globe, it will become manifest decades from now long after Obama has come and gone, when the world will be a very different place. The 2008 presidential election is therefore a test as to whether or not the Left in the US can overcome its fractious divides and begin establishing long-term coalitions designed to gain power and govern effectively while maintaining an ideological commitment to generating reformist and revolutionary strategies from below.
Given the complexities of this task, there is no guarantee that it could be accomplished even if Obama wins. Certainly, such a movement will not coalesce if a newly mobilized Left is not ready to immediately begin allying with or forcefully petitioning/pressuring the Obama administration from within and without. However, should McCain win in November, or should he lose but nonetheless permanently remobilize the reactionary (racist) right-wing fringe that his campaign has now activated, the prospects for Left organizing will be greatly diminished. A McCain-Palin administration would present most of the same obstacles that the Left has faced under the Bush-Cheney regime. Meanwhile, an Obama-Biden administration that lacks a strong base of dedicated progressive support could eventually succumb to the anger and frustration of working-class whites in rural America who will be easily convinced that their problems are the result of the foreigners, socialists, and terrorist sympathizers etc. that have infiltrated the Democratic Party through Obama. In short, conditions at the present crossroads are ripe for a concerted effort to push the country towards something like a European social democracy (partial nationalization of US banks has, for instance, just been announced). At the same time, some variant of a violent reaction—call it fascism or whatever else—is lurking just beneath the surface of an American populace, racked with panic and fear, recently shaped by George W. Bush’s Republicans yet poised to swing decisively leftwards into the arms of Barack Obama’s Democrats.
Sunday, October 5, 2008
DEBATING THE DEBATE: OBAMA, THE NEOCONS, AND AMERICAN EMPIRE (Follow-Up)
SPECTACLE '08/EMPIRE WATCH
BRANDON'S REPLY:
MY THOUGHTS IN RESPONSE:
For the most part, I don't think we disagree about much other than how best to confront and/or negotiate the realities of the Democratic party's hegemony over the American Left. The Democrats of today are a Center-Left party just as the Republicans are fundamentally of the Center-Right. Both of course are rooted in the European liberal-humanistic tradition (à la John Locke), although the contemporary GOP offers a more "conservative" articulation of liberalism symbolized by the thinking of, say, Edmund Burke. Our "two-party system" thus presents a pair of dialectically antagonistic political opponents that are ultimately more similar than not in most philosophical respects. According to Louis Hartz in The Liberal Tradition in America, this ideological cohesion, i.e. lack of Marxian "class struggle," is attributed to the absence of European-style feudalism in US history (antebellum Southern plantations being the closest thing). While Hartz's theory has significant holes, it does make a compelling case for the argument that a lack of mass peasant-to-proletariat conversion in America laid the foundation for what became a lack of class consciousness and, ultimately, the failure of socialism to take root on any significant scale. There being no actual Ancien Régime to rebel against--only an upper-echelon of citizens organized into a putatively benevolent political class--there has been no truly profound social antagonism along the lines of Paris in 1848 or Russia in 1917. Without an essentially feudal/aristocratic order that would beget its revolutionary overthrow, there has permeated the Horatio Alger mythology pointing a patriotic working-class upwards towards the always just out-of-reach "American Dream." Rather than contest the power of the ruling petit-bourgeoisie, people seek to join it.
Progressive liberals are thus often only marginally different (if not indistinguishable) from conservative liberals: Joe Lieberman, anyone? So with regard to either Obama on Afghanistan or JFK on Vietnam, one might generalize that the Democrats are ultimately good capitalist-imperialists just like their Republican colleagues. That said, we don't have the "luxury" (as they do in, say, Sweden or Spain of casting a meaningful vote for a functioning Communist, Socialist, Green, Labor or Social-Democratic, etc. alternative to the major liberal and conservative parties. We have no coalition governments with assemblies comprised of a myriad different factions representing constituencies across the political spectrum. Rather, we have two centrist parties that are in fact today heavily leveraged by corporate power. Furthermore, there is no cohesive anti-capitalist/anti-imperialist political force ready to materialize any time soon. This was all too evident during the recent Wall Street crisis and $700 billion Congressional bailout brouhaha: there is no Marxist-Leninist oriented discourse available to provide a "serious" (that is taken seriously) response to what can plausibly be characterized as the real-time demise of free-market ideology if not capitalism generally. The "critical Left" has been relegated to either stomaching whatever pathetic solution the Democratic leadership offers, or bitterly yet ineffectively denouncing it.
The same can be said for what remains of America's overseas military-economic empire and the ideology of "exceptionalism," i.e. "Manifest Destiny," upon which it is premised. As US global power over-extends itself in Iraq under the watch of a coalition led by the far Right, the moderate Democratic Left proposes only to scale-back and downsize, if not just refocus the nation's "foreign entanglements." While the Cold War provided justification for US interventionism as a means of promoting Lockean ideals throughout the world in response to the spread of communism, the liberal-conservative foreign policy Establishment now wrestles with how to craft a Global War on Terror (GWOT) into another long-term paradigm under which a new "American Century" can be sustained. And clearly, whether it be in the Iraq and Afghanistan quagmires, or the fact of a swiftly "rising" China/ Euro-Asian power bloc that virtually owns whatever remains of the US economy, signs abound that the much anticipated "end of American empire" is upon us. Yet we shouldn't look to the Democrats to begin immediately calling for the dismantling of the military-industrial complex.
So what should we be doing?
Rather than simply bash the Democratic leadership's centrist foreign policy, the critical Left might focus its attention on how to articulate a substantial and coherent strategy that could challenge a potential Obama administration to move in a progressive direction just as Bill Clinton found that he could not govern effectively without sliding to the right so as to please Republicans in Congress. Recent conservative successes can no doubt be attributed to the strength of their coalition in these regards. If there is a new Democratic administration alongside an enhanced Democratic majority in the House and Senate come January 2009, there ought to also be an energized progressive coalition that includes members of Congress as well as movement activists associated with MoveOn, Code Pink, and any grassroots organization interested in solidifying a leftwing hegemony.
Hence, imagine if the Obama-Biden White House (having begun a de-escalation in Iraq) introduced a bill to fund the war in Afghanistan that was rejected by a bloc of antiwar Democrats in Congress who were able to win over some (libertarian) Republican support. The House of Representatives' initial rejection of the Bush-Paulson Wall Street bailout has illuminated a newly fractious political atmosphere seeming to produce a realignment, on one hand, towards economic populism--77 Democrats (many from the Black, Latino, and Progressive Caucuses) voted along with the majority of Republicans against the bill. How this realignment might translate into Congressional action in the realm of foreign policy is unclear, yet one could at least envision a scenario whereby progressives in the House work with allies in the Green Party and elsewhere (read: Dennis Kucinich, Lynn Woolsey, etc. team-up with Ralph Nader and Cynthia McKinney) to push for a massive shift of resources from foreign intervention towards health care, education, infrastructure, and renewable energy. Since a massive reduction in defense spending may be the only way to pay for the social programs that Obama has rhetorically committed himself to, progressives should contemplate how to effectively challenge the nascent GWOT consensus and make isolationism popular once again across the political spectrum. Such a reality could be foreseeable, even if not necessarily likely, with Obama and the Democrats in the White House.
So its ultimately not just a question of Obama being better than McCain, just as Kennedy was better than Nixon in 1960 or "Kang" better than "Kodos" in 1996. The question is whether or not progressives might form a coalition that could have actual influence in the direction of national affairs. Given all the dynamics of Obama's current function in American society, the political terrain would be infinitely more ripe for a major transition should he win and take office with Democrats in control amid a "new" Great Depression demanding another New Deal. At this moment, we should be working for the solidification of a Social Democratic bloc that can operate in a critical alliance (when possible) with the Obama-Biden administration to produce a progressive reformation of American society at the dawn of the "global century."
The stakes are too high for anything but a grand vision of how to work with what we are being given, and cooperate with whomever we can, in order to create the other world that we all know is possible. If we are to succeed in this albeit lofty goal, the critical Left must be willing to abandon a certain sense of ideological purity in the interest of creating the conditions that will be most conducive to radical reform and, perhaps, revolution. While the "change we need" certainly does not end with a new Democratic administration, any hope therein would surely never begin should John McCain become the 44th President of the United States.
Thus it boils down to three simple words: OBAMA, OR BUST!
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As always, I love your optimism and enthusiasm, though i think you may be reading too much into Obama's internationalism and his connection to Brzezinski.
Brzezinski was perhaps the loudest critic of Obama's much touted plan to "surge" US forces in Afghanistan, describing his proposal as falling into the "Afghan trap" he set for the Soviets (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f031f936-56a0-11dd-8686-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1), but then Zbig was one of the loudest voices calling for a confrontation with Russia over Georgia- Zbig has an an acute case of what Roger Morris calls "the Baltic Syndrome" -- east Europeans driven by ethnic and national hatreds of Russia that render them incapable of any truly realistic fp analysis. But I think Zbig is neither here nor there. He says that he supports the campaign, but will not take any formal adviser role because he doesn't want to be forced to subordinate his analysis to the dictates of domestic lobbies (bywhich he means AIPAC). He would like to keep his ethnic and national hatreds pure, in this sense. And Obama for his part wants to have nothing to do with Zbig for fear of alienating his AIPAC base of support.
My sense is that there is no grand strategic thinking here, only election year posturing. The Dems have long believed that they demonstrate their fp and national security credentials by outflanking Republicans on the right in Afghanistan. They have not however, succeeded in explaining how escalating America's involvement in that country will make the situation any better, nor have they explained how exactly we are going to pay for said escalation (Fareed Zakaria had a great discussion with Rory Stewart on the subject a couple weeks ago:
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0809/07/fzgps.01.html).
Afghanistan is indicative of the moral, political and intellectual bankruptcy of the Dems (AKA the "me too" party) as a whole. I understand why the Dems are so eager to appear the Me Too Party on fp issues (see forthcoming post) but I think this kind posturing lacks moral courage and is strategically stupid. For eg, I have no idea why on god's green earth Obama would choose to tell O'Rielly that the surge has succeeded "beyond our wildest dreams," instead of arguing (as Dreyfuss did on DN this morning) that it flew in the face of all expert opinion and has kept us in there spending $10b a month for two more years. He could also compliment the intelligence of the electorate by citing the wealth of expert analysis that attributes the decrease in violence in Iraq (though still incredibly high) to factors intrinsic to Iraqi society and politics- namely the Shi'ite victory over their Sunni rivals in an Iraqi civil war that successfully imposed ethnic and sectarian segregation on a formerly integrated society (isn't it amazing how dramatically violence dropped in Virgina from 1865 to 1866-- the funny thing about civil wars is that once one side wins, violence goes down...).
when it comes to fp, Obama has assured all those that matter that he will not produce any dramatic departures from received practice and wisdom.
Sure, he may be better than McCain, but that is really not saying much. Its a bit like saying JFK was better than Nixon in 1960. Sure, I guess so, but isn't this a rather dubious distinction? Isn't JFK the one that escalated US involvement in Vietnam? Would Nixon have done the same, or would he have continued his predecessor's policy of limiting US involvement? We can never know, but what we can know is that presidents can become prisoners of their own rhetoric-just as JFK was held hostage to the discourse of communist containment - so too is Obama (BHO) trapped in the discourse of the GWOT. I don't suppose that it will be easier to challenge its dominant symbols on Nov 5, than it will be on Nov 3.
My sense is that the Dems will continue to get railroaded on fp issues until they invent a new language for challenging the presuppositions of received wisdom, and we will continue to be saddled with the burdens of Empire (ie low levels of public investment, high levels of public debt, and an anti-intellectual, anti-dissent, quasi-fascist political culture).
As I said in the post, economic circumstances may sweep BHO into the WH, and may force him to reevaluate priorities once there. But even if it turns this way (as I sincerely hope it does), Obama will have contributed nothing to the more fundamental task of refashioning the symbols of American national identity, and articulating a new vision of America's place in history and the world. On the contrary he will have the dubious distinction of having been on the wrong side of that struggle.
One little addition: JFK was a prisoner of the discourse of communist containment that HE HELPED CONSTRUCT (most famously by challenging the republicans from the right for going soft against the Ruskies (the "missile gap." and allowing a detente to to take shape)).
Discursive deconstruction is not just for our friends in the lit dept-- "going with the flow" is best left to dead fish.